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Abstract
Motivated by the sequential detection of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in a dynamic smart
grid, we consider a more general problem of sequentially detecting time-varying FDIAs in dynamic
linear regression models. The unknown time-varying parameter vector in the linear regression model
and the FDIAs impose a significant challenge for designing a computationally efficient detector. We
first propose two Cumulative-Sum-type algorithms to address this challenge. One is called generalized
Cumulative-Sum (GCUSUM) algorithm, and the other one is called relaxed generalized Cumulative-
Sum (RGCUSUM) algorithm, which is a modified version of the GCUSUM. It can be shown that the
computational complexity of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm scales linearly with the number of
observations. Next, considering Lordon’s setup, for any given constraint on the expected false alarm
period, a lower bound on the threshold employed in the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is derived,
which provides a guideline for the design of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm to achieve the prescribed
performance requirement. In addition, for any given threshold employed in the proposed RGCUSUM
algorithm, an upper bound on the expected detection delay is also provided. The performance of the
proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is also numerically studied in the context of an IEEE standard power
system under FDIAs.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent developments in sensing, signal processing, control, and communication, the smart grid
system is tightly integrated with cyber infrastructures, such as computer and communication networks,
which makes it vulnerable to hostile cyber threats [1]. The cyber-security and safety is a critical issue in
smart grid systems since any outage, failure or cyber-attacks may bring about catastrophic consequences
such as significant financial losses and blackouts in large geographic areas. When compared to detecting
random errors, the detection of malicious data attacks in smart grid systems is far more difficult and is
still an open problem, since adversaries can judiciously choose the site of attack and design attack data
in a very sophisticated way. Hence, cyber-security in smart grid systems has drawn significant interest
in recent years [1]–[5].
In a smart grid system, meter readings are periodically collected and stored by a supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The meter measurements are utilized at a control center to estimate
state variables of the smart grid system, such as bus voltages and phase angles, and then the operation of
the smart grid system is performed and controlled based on these estimated states. If any adversary is able
to falsify the meter measurements, the control center may produce erroneous state estimates, which brings
about wrong decisions on billing, power dispatch, and even blackout. To this end, protection mechanism
is of paramount importance in modern smart grid systems which should have the capability of detecting
malicious attacks as quickly as possible.
Most of the existing works on attack detection in smart grid systems consider fixed-sample-size
schemes, which aim to reach a satisfactory balance between the false alarm probability and detection
probability. These fixed-sample-size schemes are useful when there is no strict latency constraint. How-
ever, the detection of malicious attacks in smart grid systems is subject to strict latency constraints, since
such attacks can be judiciously designed, and if not promptly detected, can cause increasingly catastrophic
consequences to the system as time goes by. The sequential change detection methodology (also known
as quickest detection), which minimizes the expected detection delay subject to certain performance
constraint on the average false alarm period, enables online monitoring for smart grid systems, and
therefore suits well to attack detection in such systems.
A. Summary of Results and Main Contributions
We assume that every meter sequentially transmits its measurements to a control center. However the
measurements from a subset of meters are corrupted by additive malicious data. Such attacks are referred
to as false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which are considered as one of most detrimental attacks to
smart grid systems [1]. The set of attacked meters and the malicious data injected into the attacked meters
3are unknown to the control center; and moreover, we assume that they can be distinct at different time
instants. In addition, we assume that the state variables of the smart grid system are time-varying, and
also unknown to the control center. It is worth mentioning that we do not assume knowledge of the state
evolution dynamic, i.e., how the state variables change over time. The control center aims at detecting
any FDIAs as soon as possible when they are launched, and the sequential change detection scheme is
considered in this paper.
The task of sequentially detecting time-varying FDIAs in such a dynamic system seems difficult. The
reasons are mainly twofold. On one hand, since the state variables are time-varying and unknown to the
control center, even though the control center observes a change in some statistic of the measurements,
it is not clear whether the change of the statistic is brought about by the unknown change of the state
variables or by the occurrence of FDIAs. On the other hand, the number of possible sets of attacked
meters is an exponential function of the number of meters. Thus, when the number of meters is large,
which is typically the case in practice, it is strenuous to figure out which meters are attacked due to a
large number of possibilities.
Motivated by the sequential FDIA detection task described above, in this paper, we consider a gen-
eral problem of sequentially detecting time-varying FDIAs in dynamic linear regression models, which
subsumes the quickest FDIA detection in smart grid systems when the direct current (DC) power flow
model is adopted.
Since the parameter vector in the dynamic linear regression model is unknown, we first resort to
the generalized Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm. However, it can be shown that the computational
complexity of the generalized CUSUM method scales exponentially with the number of observations, and
therefore is infeasible in practice. To address this, we next propose a new CUSUM-type algorithm based
on the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR), which is called relaxed generalized CUSUM (RGCUSUM)
algorithm. The proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is computationally efficient and also robust to arbitrary
time-varying parameter vector in the linear regression model and the FDIAs. To be specific, it can
be shown that the computational complexity of the RGCUSUM algorithm just scales linearly with the
number of meters, and therefore, the RGCUSUM algorithm is more amenable than the generalized
CUSUM to implementation in practice. Moreover, this paper lays more emphasis on the performance
characterization of the RGCUSUM algorithm with the aim of providing provable detection performance
guarantee. In particular, considering Lordon’s setup [6], for any given constraint on the expected false
alarm period, a lower bound on the threshold employed in the proposed algorithm is derived, which
provides a guideline for the design of the RGCUSUM algorithm to achieve the prescribed performance
requirement. In addition, for any given threshold employed in the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm, an
4upper bound on the expected detection delay is also provided. In the numerical results, the performance of
the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is scrutinized in the context of an IEEE standard power system under
FDIAs, and is compared with some representative algorithm. Numerical studies illustrate the reliable and
quick response of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm against time-varying FDIAs in dynamic linear
regression models.
B. Related Work
There is an increasing concern about the security of smart grid networks, see [1]–[5], [7]–[13] and the
references therein. Most of these works investigate the attack detection problem in smart grid systems
under the fixed-sample-size scheme, while this paper focuses on the sequential attack detection scheme.
The quickest detection of time-varying FDIA in dynamic smart grid systems with the DC power flow
model adopted has attracted more and more attention in recent years.
An adaptive CUSUM algorithm is proposed in [4], which assumes that the state variables of the smart
grid follows a Gaussian prior with some known mean and covariance, and also assumes that the FDIA
is always positive and small so that the first-order approximation to the decision statistic is valid. The
approach proposed in [4], as a result, becomes inefficient for large FDIA, which could be more devastating
to the system, and also for negative FDIA. On the contrary, we do not assume any prior for the state
variables, and moreover, we do not impose any restriction on the sign and the magnitude of the FDIA.
Real-time FDIA detection in static smart grid systems is studied in [5], where a CUSUM-type algorithm
is proposed based on the residuals. In [5], the Rao test statistic is utilized to construct the decision
statistic. However in many cases, such decision statistic cannot be evaluated due to the singularity of the
covariance of the residuals, see Section V for instance. The quickest detection of FDIA in smart grids
is also investigated in [14], where the attack model is different from the model considered in this paper.
To be specific, the set of effective attacked meters is assumed to be fixed over time in [14], while we
allow the adversaries to effectively attack distinct meters at different time instants. Thus, the attack model
considered in this paper is more general. Moreover, no performance analysis of the proposed algorithm is
provided in [14], while in this paper, we not only propose a computationally efficient algorithm but also
provide provable detection performance guarantees for the proposed algorithm. More recently, in [15], a
CUSUM-type algorithm based on the Kalman filter is proposed, which relies on the assumption that the
state variables of the smart grid evolve over time by following a known linear model. On the contrary,
in this paper, no assumption is made on the dynamic of the time-varying state variables. In addition, no
performance analysis is provided for the proposed algorithm in [15].
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The problem statement and background are
described in Section II. The generalized CUSUM algorithm and the computationally efficient RGCUSUM
algorithm are introduced in Section III. In Section IV, the performance of the proposed algorithms is
investigated. In Section V, numerical results are provided to illustrate the performance of the proposed
approach. Finally, Section VI provides our conclusions.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we first formulate the general FDIA detection problem in dynamic linear regression
models, which is motivated by the FDIA detection problem in dynamic smart grid systems where the
DC power flow model is adopted. Then, the quickest detection technique for sequentially detecting the
occurrence of attacks is briefly introduced.
A. Problem Statement
We consider a dynamic linear regression model in which
x(t) = Hθ(t) + n(t) (1)
where x(t) ∈ RM , θ(t) ∈ RN and n(t) ∈ RM are an M -dimensional vector of observations, an N -
dimensional vector of unknown parameters and an M -dimensional vector of noise at time instant t,
respectively. H ∈ RM×N is an M ×N linear model matrix. Typically, the number of measurements is
greater than that of the unknown parameters in order to provide necessary redundancy against the noise
effect, i.e., M > N .
Suppose that at time ta, a malicious attacker intentionally manipulates the observation vector by
injecting a sequence of unknown false data {b(1),b(2),b(3), ...}. Accordingly, we write the pre- and
post-attack observations as  x(t) = Hθ(t) + n(t) if t < ta,x(t) = Hθ(t) + a(t) + n(t) if t ≥ ta, (2)
where a(ta+t−1) = b(t) for any ta and t ≥ 1. Note that the injected false data a(t) can be decomposed
into two parts
a(t) = Hc(t) + µ(t) (3)
where Hc(t) denotes the component of a(t) that lies in the column space of H, while µ(t) represents the
component of a(t) that lies in the complementary space R⊥(H) of the column space of H, that is
µ(t) = P⊥Ha
(t) ∈ R⊥(H) (4)
6where
P⊥H , I−H
(
HTH
)−1
HT . (5)
As illustrated in [16], µ(t) is the only informative part of the injected false data that is detectable. The
reason is that since the parameter vector θ(t) is unknown, the other partHc(t) of a(t) is not distinguishable
from Hθ(t), and hence can bypass any monitoring system.
Let ρL and ρU denote the lower and upper bounds on the magnitudes of the nonzero elements of µ(t),
respectively. Let A(t) represent the set of nonzero elements of µ(t) at time instant t. As such, we can
rewrite the pre- and post-attack model as
t < ta : µ
(t)
m = 0,m = 1, 2, ...,M,
t ≥ ta :
 ρL ≤ |µ
(t)
m | ≤ ρU ,m ∈ A(t),
µ
(t)
m = 0,m /∈ A(t),
(6)
where µ(t)m is the m-th element of µ(t). It is worth mentioning that since µ(t) can be time-varying, so can
be the set A(t), which is referred to as the set of attacked observations at time instant t thereafter. Our
goal is to detect the attacks as soon as possible after their occurrence at time ta. The quickest detection
technique, that exploits the statistical difference before and after ta, provides a suitable framework to
achieve this goal, and hence, in this paper, we resort to these techniques to detect the false data injection
attacks described in (2).
The FDIA detection problem described in (2) is motivated by the problem of detecting FDIAs in
smart grid systems. To be specific, consider M meters in an (N + 1)-bus smart grid system. Then the
dynamic DC power flow model of the system can be exactly formulated as in (1) where the unknown
parameter vector θ(t) is the N phase angles (one reference angle) at time t which evolves over time
due to the time-varying workload in the system, and the vector of observations x(t) is the measurements
of the power flows and power injections at the M meters at time instant t. The linear model matrix H
in the context of a smart grid is the measurement matrix which depends on the topology of the smart
grid, the placement of the meters, and the susceptance of each transmission line. Moreover, the attack
model in (2) essentially demonstrates that the adversaries employ a sequence of false data to corrupt the
meter readings starting at some time instant. For more details about the application of the FDIA detection
problem described in (2) to smart grid systems, please refer to Section V.
If adversaries could perfectly know the measurement matrix H and manipulate the observations x(t)
at any meter they want, then they would be able to design the false data injection attack a(t) to be stealth
attack which lies in the column space H, i.e., µ(t) = 0, and hence bypass any security system [16].
Fortunately, this is not the case in a smart grid system. In particular, a smart grid system is large scale
7in practice, and the meters in the system are widely distributed. Hence, the adversaries typically can
only access and manipulate a subset of meters which are close to them due to their limited amount of
resources. Moreover, by securing sufficient number of meters in the smart grid system, stealth attacks can
be prevented according to [3], where the fundamental limit of the stealth attacks were studied. Therefore,
we assume that if the system is under attack, then µ(t) 6= 0. The constant ρL indicates the lower bound
on the nonzero element of µ(t) that draws security concerns, and the constant ρU represents the limited
power of the adversaries. In addition, we assume that {n(t)} in (2) is a sequence of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise vectors obeying Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2IM ) with mean 0 and
covariance σ2IM .
B. Quickest Detection
In quickest detection, observations are made sequentially in time, and then stop when a change is
declared. The sequential change detector aims at minimizing the expected detection delay after the
change-point. The commonly used performance measure, proposed by Lorden, is the worst-case expected
detection delay which is defined as [6]
J (T )
∆
= sup
ta
Jta (T ) , (7)
with
Jta (T )
∆
= ess supFta−1Eta
{
(T − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1} (8)
where the random variable T is a stopping time corresponding to a certain sequential detection scheme
and Fta is the filtration generated by all the observations up to time ta. The expectation Eta is evaluated
with respect to the true distribution of x(1), x(2), x(3), ... when the change occurs at time instant ta. The
essential supremum in (8) is obtained over Fta−1, yielding the least favorable situation for the expected
detection delay. The supremum in (7) is obtained over ta, implying that the change occurs at such a
point that the expected detection delay is maximized. To summarize, J(T ) characterizes the expected
detection delay for the worst possible change point and the worst possible history of observations before
the change point. While small expected detection delay under attack brings about timely alarmed reaction,
the running length under no attack needs to be guaranteed to be large enough to avoid frequent false
alarms. To this end, the sequential change detection problem is formulated as follows:
inf
T
J (T ) subject to E∞ {T} ≥ γ. (9)
Note that the expectation E∞ is evaluated with respect to the probability measure where ta =∞, i.e., no
change occurs, and γ is a prescribed constant which specifies the required lower bound on the expected
8false alarm period. To proceed with our FDIA detection problem, we denote the pre-attack and post-attack
probability density functions of the observation x(t) as fu(x(t)
∣∣θ(t) ) and fa(x(t) ∣∣θ(t),a(t) ), respectively.
If all the parameters {θ(t)} and {a(t)} were known, the quickest detection problem in (9) is optimally
solved by the well-known CUSUM test [17]
TCUSUM = min
{
K : max
1≤k≤K
K∑
t=k
ln
fa
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t),a(t) )
fu
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t) ) ≥ h
}
, (10)
where the threshold h is determined by the constraint in (9). For a given K, the value of k which
maximizes the test statistic in (10) can be considered as an estimate of change point. It is well-known
that the nonlinear accumulation of the log-likelihood ratios in (10) can be written in a recursive way, and
hence can be easily implemented in practice with low complexity [18], [19].
Note that in our FDIA detection problem, the parameters {θ(t)} and {a(t)} are unknown, rendering
the CUSUM test infeasible. To address this, this paper resort to the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR)
method by replacing the unknown parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) [18], [19].
We next propose a sequential attack detector based on the GLR idea.
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACK DETECTION BASED ON RELAXED GENERALIZED CUSUM TEST
In this section, we first derive a GLR-based FDIA sequential detector, namely generalized CUSUM
(GCUSUM), but its complexity grows exponentially with respect to the size M of the observation vector,
rendering the GCUSUM infeasible when M is large. Then, we propose a modified sequential detector
whose computational complexity grows linearly with respect to M .
A. Generalized CUSUM Test
Based on the model in (6), by replacing the unknown parameters {θ(t)} and {a(t)} in (10) with their
MLEs, the GCUSUM test can be written as
TG = min
{
K : max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
Λ
(K)
k ≥ h
}
, (11)
9where
Λ
(K)
k
∆
= ln
sup
θ(t),a(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
k−1∏
t=1
fu
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t) ) K∏
t=k
fa
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t),a(t) )
sup
θ(t)
K∏
t=1
fu
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t) )
= ln
k−1∏
t=1
sup
θ(t)
fu
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t) ) K∏
t=k
sup
θ(t),a(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
fa
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t),a(t) )
K∏
t=1
sup
θ(t)
fu
(
x(t)
∣∣θ(t) )
=
K∑
t=k
[
sup
θ(t),a(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
ln fa
(
x(t)
∣∣∣θ(t),a(t))−sup
θ(t)
ln fu
(
x(t)
∣∣∣θ(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=Λ(K)k,t
]
. (12)
Given that n(t)
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2IM ), Λ(K)k,t can be simplified to
Λ
(K)
k,t = sup
θ(t) ,a(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
− 1
2σ2
(
x(t) −Hθ(t) − a(t)
)T (
x(t) −Hθ(t) − a(t)
)
− sup
θ(t)
− 1
2σ2
(
x(t) −Hθ(t)
)T (
x(t) −Hθ(t)
)
= sup
a(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
− 1
2σ2
[(
x(t) − a(t)
)T
P⊥H
(
x(t) − a(t)
)
−
(
x(t)
)T
P⊥Hx
(t)
]
= sup
µ(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
1
2σ2
[
2
(
µ(t)
)T
x˜(t) −
∥∥∥µ(t)∥∥∥2
2
]
= sup
µ(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
1
2σ2
∑
m∈A(t)
[
2µ(t)m x˜
(t)
m −
(
µ(t)m
)2]
(13)
by employing (4). In (13), P⊥H is defined in (5), x˜
(t) is the component of x(t) in the complementary
space of the column space of H, i.e.,
x˜(t)
∆
= P⊥Hx
(t), (14)
and x˜(t)m and µ
(t)
m are the m-th elements of x˜(t) and µ(t), respectively.
As a result, by employing (12) and (13), at time instant K, the test statistic of the GCUSUM in (11)
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can be rewritten as
VK
∆
= max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
Λ
(K)
k
= max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
K∑
t=k
Λ
(K)
k,t
= max
1≤k≤K
K∑
t=k
sup
A(t)
sup
µ(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
1
2σ2
∑
m∈A(t)
[
2µ(t)m x˜
(t)
m −
(
µ(t)m
)2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=vt
, (15)
and further, can be calculated in a recursive way that
VK = max
1≤k≤K
K∑
t=k
vt = max
{
max
1≤k≤K−1
K∑
t=k
vt, vK
}
= max {VK−1, 0}+ vK , with V0 = 0. (16)
We summarize the procedure for implementing the GCUSUM in Algorithm 1. The recursive expression
in (16) implies that the test statistic of the GCUSUM can be efficiently obtained if vt is available for for
t. However, the complexity of computing the statistic vt in (15) is generally very high, especially when
M is large. To be specific, it is seen from (16) that in order to obtain vt,
1
2σ2
∑
m∈A(t) [2µ
(t)
m x˜
(t)
m − (µ(t)m )2]
needs to be maximized over µ(t) for a given A(t) first, and then maximized over all possible A(t). Since
the number of possible A(t) is on the order of 2M , vt may be computed exactly by exhaustively searching
through all possible A(t) for a small M , while for a large M , this is not feasible in practice. To this end,
the GCUSUM test in (11) is not amenable to implementation in practice, which motivates us to pursue
more computationally efficient algorithms.
Algorithm 1 Generalized CUSUM Algorithm
1: Input: x(t), H, ρL, ρU , σ2 and h
2: Output: TG
3: Initialization: t← 0, V0 ← 0
4: while Vt < h do
5: t← t+ 1
6: Evaluate Λ(K)k,t by using (13).
7: vt ← supA(t) Λ(K)k,t
8: Update the decision statistic: Vt ← max {Vt−1, 0}+ vt.
9: end while
10: TG ← t, declare an FDIA.
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B. Relaxed Generalized CUSUM Test
In order to facilitate the computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM in (16), we first simplify
the computation of the statistic Λ(K)k,t in (13).
It is seen from (13) that Λ(K)k,t is the solution of a constrained optimization problem, and there is
generally no closed-form expression for Λ(K)k,t due to the constraints on µ
(t) in (13). Here, we relax the
constraint µ(t) ∈ R⊥(H), and correspondingly, Λ(K)k,t can be bounded from above as per
Λ
(K)
k,t = sup
µ(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t) ,µ(t)∈R⊥(H)
1
2σ2
∑
m∈A(t)
[
2µ(t)m x˜
(t)
m −
(
µ(t)m
)2]
≤ sup
µ(t):{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t)
1
2σ2
∑
m∈A(t)
[
2µ(t)m x˜
(t)
m −
(
µ(t)m
)2]
=
1
2σ2
∑
m∈A(t)
sup
µ
(t)
m :{ρL≤|µ(t)m |≤ρU}m∈A(t)
[
2µ(t)m x˜
(t)
m −
(
µ(t)m
)2]
=
∑
m∈A(t)
ζ(t)m
, Λ˜
(K)
k,t , (17)
where
ζ(t)m ,

1
2σ2
(
x˜
(t)
m
)2
if ρL ≤
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU ,
1
2σ2
(
2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ρL − ρ2L) if ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ < ρL,
1
2σ2
(
2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ρU − ρ2U) if ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ > ρU .
(18)
As a result, by replacing Λ(K)k,t with Λ˜
(K)
k,t in (11), a relaxed generalized CUSUM (RGCUSUM) test
can be expressed as
TR = min
{
K : max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
K∑
t=k
Λ˜
(K)
k,t ≥ h
}
= min
{
K : max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
K∑
t=k
∑
m∈A(t)
ζ(t)m ≥ h
}
. (19)
It is worth mentioning that since
max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
K∑
t=k
Λ˜
(K)
k,t ≥ max1≤k≤K sup{A(t)}
K∑
t=k
Λ
(K)
k,t = max1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
Λ
(K)
k , (20)
we know that TR ≤ TG for any given h, which implies that for a given h, the RGCUSUM test rule in
(19) reduces the detection delay when compared to the GCUSUM test rule in (11) at the expense of a
shorter false alarm period.
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Let ω(K) denote the test statistic of the RGCUSUM at time instant K, which can be simplified to
ω(K)
∆
= max
1≤k≤K
sup
{A(t)}
K∑
t=k
∑
m∈A(t)
ζ(t)m
= max
1≤k≤K
K∑
t=k
sup
A(t)
∑
m∈A(t)
ζ(t)m
= max
1≤k≤K
K∑
t=k
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
. (21)
Noting that max{ζ(t)m , 0} ≥ 0, we can obtain
ω(K) = max
1≤k≤K
K∑
t=k
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
= max
{
max
1≤k≤K−1
K∑
t=k
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
,
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(K)m , 0
}}
= max
{
ω(K−1), 0
}
+
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(K)m , 0
}
= ω(K−1) +
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(K)m , 0
}
(22)
with ω(0) , 0. Hence, ω(K) can be calculated recursively. Furthermore, from (22), the test statistic of
the RGCUSUM can be rewritten as
ω(K) =
K∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
, (23)
and therefore, by employing (19), (21) and (23), the stopping time of the RGCUSUM can be simplified
to
TR = min
{
K : ω(K) ≥ h
}
= min
{
K :
K∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
≥ h
}
. (24)
The procedure for implementing the proposed RGCUSUM is summarized in Algorithm 2. It is seen
from (16) and (22) that the test statistics of the GCUSUM and the RGCUSUM can be both expressed
in a recursive way, which can greatly facilitate the computation of the corresponding test statistics in the
sequential setting. However, it is worth pointing out that the computational complexity of the test statistic
of the RGCUSUM is just linear in the number M of observations since there is a closed-form expression
for ζ(t)m ; while the computational complexity of the test statistic of the GCUSUM is exponential in M
as explained in Section III-A. To this end, the RGCUSUM test rule is more amenable to implementation
in practice, especially when M is large.
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Algorithm 2 RGCUSUM Algorithm
1: Input: x(t), H, ρL, ρU , σ2 and h
2: Output: TR
3: Initialization: K ← 0, ω(0) ← 0
4: while ω(K) < h do
5: K ← K + 1
6: Evaluate ζ(K)m for all m by using (18).
7: Update the decision statistic: ω(K) ← ω(K−1) +∑Mm=1max{ζ(K)m , 0}.
8: end while
9: TR ← K, declare an FDIA.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RELAXED GENERALIZED CUSUM TEST
In this section, we provide the performance analysis of our proposed RGCUSUM test. In particular,
we provide a sufficient condition under which the constraint on the expected false alarm period in (9)
can be guaranteed, which offers insight on the design of the proposed RGCUSUM test rule to achieve
the prescribed performance requirement. Moreover, an upper bound on the worst-case expected detection
delay defined in (7) is also derived.
It is seen from (23) that for a given K, the test statistic of the RGCUSUM is fully determined by the
sequences {max{ζ(t)m , 0}}t≥1 for all m. In light of this, in order to investigate the performance of the
RGCUSUM, we first characterize the statistical properties of the sequences {max{ζ(t)m , 0}}t≥1 for all m.
Let pTi denote the i-th row of the projection matrix P
⊥
H, i.e.,
P⊥H = [p1,p2, ...,pM ]
T (25)
By employing the definition of x˜(t) in (14), we can obtain
x˜(t)m = p
T
mx
(t), (26)
which together with (2) yields that the pre- and post-attack distributions of x˜(t)m can be expressed as
x˜(t)m ∼ N
(
0, σ2 ‖pm‖22
)
(27)
and x˜(t)m ∼ N
(
pTma
(t), σ2 ‖pm‖22
)
, (28)
respectively, since pTmH = 0 due to the definition of P
⊥
H in (5).
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It is seen from (2) that since θ(t) is time-varying over t, both the pre-attack observation sequence
{x(t)}t<ta and the post-attack observation sequence {x(t)}t≥ta can be non-identically distributed. In
addition, for two distinct attack time instants ta and t′a, the corresponding observations x(ta+t) and
x(t
′
a+t) are not necessarily identically distributed for any t ≥ 0. However, it is seen from (27) that
the pre-attack observation sequence {x˜(t)m }t<ta is an i.i.d sequence. Moreover, as demonstrated by (28),
for two distinct attack time instants ta and t′a, the corresponding observations x˜
(ta+t)
m and x˜
(t′a+t)
m are
identically distributed for any t ≥ 0, since a(ta+t−1) = b(t) for any ta and t ≥ 1.
A particular note of interest is that if there is no attack and σ2 is small, then x˜(t)m is very likely to be close
to 0 from (27), which gives rise to max{ζ(t)m , 0} = 0 since from (18), ζ(t)m = 12σ2 (2|x˜
(t)
m |ρL − ρ2L) < 0
when x˜(t)m is close to 0. Hence, it is seen from (23) that the test statistic ω(K) of the RGCUSUM is very
likely to remain close to 0 as K grows. On the contrary, if attacks occur at time instant ta and pTma
(t) is
large for t ≥ ta, then from (28), a large x˜(t)m is more likely to be observed for t ≥ ta which brings about
ζ
(t)
m > 0 for t ≥ ta from (18), and hence max{ζ(t)m , 0} > 0 for t ≥ ta. Therefore, ω(K) increases fast as
K grows when K ≥ ta. To this end, the false alarm period and the detection delay of the RGCUSUM
are expected to be large and small, respectively.
In the following Lemma, we provide an upper bound and a lower bound on the expectation of the
statistic {max{ζ(t)m , 0}} with respect to the true distributions of x(1), x(2), x(3), ... when the attacks never
occur or occur at time instant ta, respectively.
Lemma 1.
E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
≤ 1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
, (29)
Eta
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
≥ ρ
2
L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
, ∀t ≥ ta (30)
where the error function
erf (x)
∆
=
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−s
2
ds. (31)
Proof: Let’s first prove (29). Notice from (18) that
ζ
(t)
m =
1
2σ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣2 if ρL ≤ ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU ,
ζ
(t)
m ≤ ρLσ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ if ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ < ρL,
ζ
(t)
m ≤ ρUσ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ if ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ > ρU ,
(32)
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which yields
E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
= E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1
{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ < ρL}}+E∞ {max{ζ(t)m , 0}1{ρL ≤ ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU}}
+E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1
{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ > ρU}}
≤ E∞
{ρL
σ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣1{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ < ρL}}+E∞{ 12σ2 ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣21{ρL ≤ ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU}
}
+E∞
{ρU
σ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣1{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ > ρU}}
≤ E∞
{
ρL + ρU
σ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣}+E∞{ 12σ2 ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣2
}
. (33)
If there is no attack, then by employing (27), we know that |x˜(t)m | and |x˜(t)m |2 follow a folded normal
distribution [20] and a chi-squared distribution, respectively, and therefore, we can obtain
E∞
{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣} = σ‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
and E∞
{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣2} = σ2 ‖pm‖22 , (34)
which implies
E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
≤ 1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
(35)
by employing (33), which completes the proof for (29).
Now, we prove (30). Since max{ζ(t)m , 0} ≥ 0, by employing (18), we can obtain
Eta
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
= Eta
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1
{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ < ρL}}+Eta {max{ζ(t)m , 0}1{ρL ≤ ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU}}
+Eta
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1
{∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ > ρU}}
≥ Eta
{
1
2σ2
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣21{ρL ≤ ∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU}}
≥ ρ
2
L
2σ2
Eta
{
1
{
ρL ≤
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU}}
=
ρ2L
2σ2
Pta
(
ρL ≤
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU) , ∀t ≥ t− a, (36)
where Pta() is the probability measure when the attack time is ta.
Noting that if t ≥ ta, then by employing (28), the probability density function of |x˜(t)m | can be written
as
1√
2piσ‖pm‖2
[
e
−(|x˜
(t)
m |−pTma(t))2
2σ2‖pm‖22 + e
−(|x˜
(t)
m |+pTma(t))2
2σ2‖pm‖22
]
, (37)
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which yields
Pta
(
ρL ≤
∣∣∣x˜(t)m ∣∣∣ ≤ ρU) = 12
[
erf
(
ρU + p
T
ma
(t)
√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
+ erf
(
ρU − pTma(t)√
2σ‖pm‖2
)]
− 1
2
[
erf
(
ρL + p
T
ma
(t)
√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
+ erf
(
ρL − pTma(t)√
2σ‖pm‖2
)]
=
1
2
[
erf
(
ρU + µ
(t)
m√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + µ
(t)
m√
2σ‖pm‖2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=g1(µ(t)m )
+
1
2
[
erf
(
ρU − µ(t)m√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL − µ(t)m√
2σ‖pm‖2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=g2(µ(t)m )
, ∀t ≥ ta, (38)
where (38) is due to the fact that µ(t)m = pTma
(t) by employing (4) and (25).
By using (31), g1(µ
(t)
m ) can be rewritten as
g1
(
µ(t)m
)
=
2√
pi
∫ ρU+µ(t)m√
2σ‖pm‖2
ρL+µ
(t)
m√
2σ‖pm‖2
e−s
2
ds (39)
which is neither convex nor concave. By taking the derivative of g1(µ
(t)
m ) with respect to µ
(t)
m , we can
obtain
dg1
(
µ
(t)
m
)
dµ
(t)
m
=
2√
2piσ‖pm‖2
[
e
−(ρU+µ
(t)
m )
2
2σ2‖pm‖22 − e−
(ρL+µ(t)m )
2
2σ2‖pm‖22
]
. (40)
It is seen from (40) that 
dg1(µ(t)m )
dµ
(t)
m
≥ 0, if µ(t)m ≤ −ρL+ρU2 ,
dg1(µ(t)m )
dµ
(t)
m
< 0, if µ(t)m > −ρL+ρU2 .
(41)
which implies that g1(µ
(t)
m ) achieves its minimum at either µ
(t)
m = −ρU or µ(t)m = ρU , since −ρU ≤
µ
(t)
m ≤ ρU due to the constraint in (6). Moreover, by employing (40), we know that for any s,
dg1
(
µ
(t)
m
)
dµ
(t)
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− ρL+ρU
2
+s
=
2√
2piσ‖pm‖2
[
e
−(
ρU−ρL
2
+s)
2
2σ2‖pm‖22 − e−
( ρU−ρL2 −s)
2
2σ2‖pm‖22
]
= −
dg1
(
µ
(t)
m
)
dµ
(t)
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− ρL+ρU
2
−s
,
(42)
and hence
dg1(µ(t)m )
dµ
(t)
m
is an odd function with respect to µ(t)m = −ρL+ρU2 . Therefore, g1(µ
(t)
m ) achieves its
minimum at µ(t)m = ρU , that is,
g1
(
µ(t)m
)
≥ g1 (ρU ) = erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
. (43)
Similarly, we can show that
g2
(
µ(t)m
)
≥ g2 (−ρU ) = erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
. (44)
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By employing (36), (38), (43) and (44), we can obtain
Eta
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
≥ ρ
2
L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
, ∀t ≥ ta, (45)
which completes the proof.
A. Conditions to Meet Expected False Alarm Period Constraint
Motivated by the FDIA detection problem formulated in (9), the expected running length of the
RGCUSUM under no attack needs to be guaranteed to be larger than the required lower bound γ to
avoid frequent false alarms. In general, we can set the threshold h in (19) to be sufficiently large so
that the constraint in (9) is satisfied. In the following, we provide a sufficient condition on h which can
guarantee that the expected false alarm period of the RGCUSUM is larger than the prescribed γ.
Theorem 1. The constraint on the expected false alarm period in (9) is satisfied provided that
h ≥ γ
M∑
m=1
(
1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
)
. (46)
Proof: By employing (23), we can obtain
E∞
{
ω(TR)
}
= E∞
{
TR∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
= E∞
{ ∞∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1 {TR ≥ t}
}
. (47)
Noting that max{ζ(t)m , 0} and 1 {TR ≥ t} are independent, and max{ζ(t)m , 0} ≥ 0, by employing the
monotone convergence theorem, E∞{ω(K)} can be simplified to
E∞
{
ω(TR)
}
=
∞∑
t=1
E∞
{
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1 {TR ≥ t}
}
=
∞∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
E∞ {1 {TR ≥ t}}
=
∞∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
E∞
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}
P∞ (TR ≥ t), (48)
where P∞ is the probability measure under no attack.
From (29) in Lemma 1 and (48), E∞{ω(TR)} can be bounded from above as per
E∞
{
ω(TR)
}
≤
∞∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
(
1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
)
P∞ (TR ≥ t)
=
M∑
m=1
(
1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
) ∞∑
t=1
P∞ (TR ≥ t)
=
M∑
m=1
(
1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
)
E∞ {TR} . (49)
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Since when a false alarm is raised, ω(TR) ≥ h which implies
E∞
{
ω(TR)
}
≥ h, (50)
and therefore,
E∞ {TR} ≥ h
M∑
m=1
(
1
2 ‖pm‖22 + ρL+ρUσ ‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
) (51)
by employing (49). Thus, if
h ≥ γ
M∑
m=1
(
1
2
‖pm‖22 +
ρL + ρU
σ
‖pm‖2
√
2
pi
)
, (52)
then E∞{TR} ≥ γ is guaranteed, which completes the proof.
As demonstrated by Theorem 1, in order to meet the constraint on the expected false alarm period,
the ratio of the threshold h employed in the RGCUSUM to the required lower bound γ on the expected
false alarm period should be larger than some constant. It is worth mentioning that this constant is only
determined by the projection operator P⊥H, the variance of the noise, and the prescribed lower and upper
bounds on the magnitude of the nonzero elements of µ(t). Therefore, when γ is given, the lower bound
on h in (46) can be calculated beforehand, and then employed in the RGCUSUM. Hence, Theorem 1
provides a guideline for the design of the proposed RGCUSUM to achieve the prescribed performance
requirement.
B. Upper Bound on the Worst-Case Expected Detection Delay
Besides the expected false alarm period, another key performance measure for quickest detection is the
worst-case expected detection delay. In this subsection, we scrutinize the worst-case expected detection
delay of the proposed RGCUSUM.
By plugging (19) into (7), the worst-case expected detection delay of the proposed RGCUSUM can
be expressed as
J (TR)
∆
= sup
ta
Jta (TR) , (53)
where
Jta (TR)
∆
= ess supFta−1Eta
{
(TR − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1} . (54)
In order to derive an upper bound on J (TR) in (53), we first provide a lemma which specifies an
upper bound on Eta{(TR − ta + 1)+|Fta−1}.
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Lemma 2. For any given ta, we have
Eta
{
(TR − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1} ≤ Eta {ω(TR)1 {TR ≥ ta}∣∣Fta−1}M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL+ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)} . (55)
Proof: Before proceeding, we first claim that
Eta
{
1 {TR ≥ ta}
TR∑
t=ta
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
≥ Eta
{
(TR − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1} M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
. (56)
This claim can be proved as follows. Note that
Eta
{
1 {TR ≥ ta}
TR∑
t=ta
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
(57)
= 1 {TR ≥ ta}Eta
{ ∞∑
t=ta
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1 {TR ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
(58)
= 1 {TR ≥ ta}
∞∑
t=ta
Eta
{
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1 {TR ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
(59)
= 1 {TR ≥ ta}
∞∑
t=ta
Eta
{
Eta
{
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
1 {TR ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1
}∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
(60)
= 1 {TR ≥ ta}
∞∑
t=ta
Eta
{
1 {TR ≥ t}
M∑
m=1
Eta
{
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}}∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
, (61)
where (58) comes from the fact that 1{TR ≥ ta} is Fta−1-measurable, (59) is due to the monotone
convergence theorem, and (60) is obtained by the Tower’s property and the fact that Fta−1 ⊆ Ft−1 when
t ≥ ta. (61) holds due to the fact that {ζ(t)m }t is an independent sequence for each m and 1{TR ≥ t} is
Ft−1-measurable.
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By employing (30) in Lemma 1 and (61), we can obtain
Eta
{
1 {TR ≥ ta}
TR∑
t=ta
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
≥ 1 {TR ≥ ta}
∞∑
t=ta
Eta {1 {TR ≥ t}| Fta−1}
×
M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
= Eta
{
1 {TR ≥ ta}
∞∑
t=1
1 {(TR − ta + 1) ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣Fta−1
}
×
M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
(62)
= Eta {(TR − ta + 1)1 {TR ≥ ta}|Fta−1}
M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
= Eta
{
(TR − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1} M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)}
, (63)
where (62) is due to the monotone convergence theorem and the fact that 1{TR ≥ ta} is Fta−1-measurable,
which completes the proof for the claim in (56).
Since max{ζ(t)m , 0} ≥ 0, by employing (23), we know that ω(TR)1{TR ≥ ta} can be bounded from
below as per
ω(TR)1 {TR ≥ ta} = 1 {TR ≥ ta}
TR∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
= 1 {TR ≥ ta}
(ta−1)∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
+ 1 {TR ≥ ta}
TR∑
t=ta
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
≥ 1 {TR ≥ ta}
TR∑
t=ta
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
, (64)
where we define
∑t2
t=t1
= 0 if t2 < t1. Therefore, by employing the claim in (56) and (64), we have
Eta
{
(TR − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1} ≤ Eta {ω(TR)1 {TR ≥ ta}∣∣Fta−1}M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
{
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL+ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)} (65)
which completes the proof for Lemma 2.
It is seen from (53) that the computation of the worst-case expected detection delay of the proposed
RGCUSUM requires taking the supremum of Jta (TR) over ta. If the stopping time TR in (19) is an
equalizer rule, that is, Jta (TR) is constant over ta, then the computation of the worst-case expected
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detection delay can be greatly simplified, since we can get rid of the supremum in (53) when we compute
the worst-case expected detection delay. Similar to the conclusion that the stopping time employed in the
CUSUM test is an equalizer rule for the classic Lorden’s problem [21], we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The stopping time TR employed in the RGCUSUM in (19) achieves an equalizer rule, i.e.,
J (TR) = sup
ta
Jta (TR) = J1 (TR) . (66)
Proof: It is seen from (23) that for any given K1 ≤ K, we have
ω(K) =
K1∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
+
K∑
t=K1+1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
= ω(K1) +
K∑
t=K1+1
M∑
m=1
max
{
ζ(t)m , 0
}
, (67)
which implies that ω(K) is an increasing function of ω(K1) for fixed {x(K1+1),x(K1+2), ...,x(K)}. Thus,
on the event {TR ≥ ta}, it is seen from (24) that TR is a nonincreasing function of ω(ta−1). In light of this,
the supremum of Eta{(TR − ta + 1)+|Fta−1} over Fta−1 is achieved at ω(ta−1) = 0, since ω(ta−1) ≥ 0
and the event {ω(ta−1) = 0} ∈ Fta−1. As a result,
Jta (TR) = ess supFta−1Eta
{
(TR − ta + 1)+
∣∣Fta−1}
= Eta
{
TR − ta + 1
∣∣ω(ta−1) = 0}
= Eta
{
TR − ta + 1
∣∣∣max{ζ(t)m , 0} = 0, ∀m and ∀t = 1, 2, ...ta − 1} , (68)
where (68) is due to the fact that ω(ta−1) =
∑ta−1
t=1
∑M
m=1max{ζ(t)m , 0} and max{ζ(t)m , 0} ≥ 0. Therefore,
the event {ω(ta−1) = 0} is equivalent to the event {max{ζ(t)m , 0} = 0, ∀m and ∀t = 1, 2, ...ta − 1}.
As discussed before, for two distinct attack time instants ta and t′a, the corresponding x˜
(ta+t)
m and
x˜
(t′a+t)
m are identically distributed for any t ≥ 0, and hence, ζ(ta+t)m and ζ(t
′
a+t)
m are identically distributed
for any t ≥ 0 according to the definition of ζ(t)m in (18). As a result, it follows from (24) and (68) in turn
that
Jta (TR) = J1 (TR) , ∀ ta ≥ 1, (69)
which implies
J (TR) = sup
ta
Jta (TR) = J1 (TR) , (70)
which completes the proof.
It is worth mentioning that the equalizer rule property of the CUSUM test for the classic Lorden’s
problem [21] relies on the fact that the pre- and post-change observation sequences are both i.i.d. with
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perfectly known distributions. However, in the problem considered in this paper, the pre- and post-attack
observation sequences are not i.i.d., and moreover, there are unknown parameters in their distributions.
Lemma 3 demonstrates that the proposed RGCUSUM test still has the equalizer rule property for the
problem considered in this paper, and therefore, we can just compute J1(TR) instead of J(TR) to scrutinize
the worst-case expected detection delay of the proposed RGCUSUM. We have the following theorem
regarding the worst-case expected detection delay of the proposed RGCUSUM.
Theorem 2. By employing Wald’s approximations [19], i.e., ignoring the expectation of the overshoots
in the presence of attacks, for any given h, the worst-case expected detection delay of the RGCUSUM
can be bounded from above as per
J (TR) ≤ h
{
M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
[
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)]}−1
. (71)
Proof: At time instant TR, we have
ω(TR) = h+∆, (72)
where ∆ is the overshoot. This implies that for any given ta,
ω(TR)1 {TR ≥ ta} = (h+∆)1 {TR ≥ ta} ≤ h+∆. (73)
It is seen from Lemma 3 that when we calculate J(TR), we can just set ta = 1 without loss of generality,
and therefore,
Eta
{
ω(TR)1 {TR ≥ ta}
∣∣∣Fta−1} = E1 {ω(TR)1 {TR ≥ 1}}
≤ h+E1 {∆}
≈ h (74)
by employing (73) and Wald’s approximations [19], i.e., ignoring the expectation of the overshoots in
the presence of attacks. Furthermore, by employing (54), Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can obtain
J (TR) = J1 (TR) ≤ h
{
M∑
m=1
ρ2L
2σ2
[
erf
(
2ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)
− erf
(
ρL + ρU√
2σ‖pm‖2
)]}−1
, (75)
which completes the proof.
As illustrated in Theorem 2, the worst-case expected detection delay of the RGCUSUM can be bounded
by a term which is proportional to the threshold h. It is worth mentioning that Wald’s approximations
are employed in Theorem 2, which implicitly assumes that the expectation of the overshoot should be
negligibly small when compared to the threshold h. In Section V, we will numerically examine the
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validity of the Wald’s approximations in some practical cases, and the results show that the Wald’s
approximations are valid when h is large.
Remark: It is worth pointing out that it seems impossible to conduct a similar performance analysis
for the GCUSUM defined in (11). The reasons are mainly twofold. On one hand, unlike ζ(t)m defined
in (18), there is no closed-from expression for vt in (15), which hinders us from deriving the statistical
characterization of vt. On the other hand, as demonstrated in (22), the test statistic ω(K) of the RGCUSUM
can be written as a linear function of ω(K−1) in its recursive expression, which facilitates the performance
analysis of the RGCUSUM. However, it is seen from (16) that VK is a nonlinear function of VK−1, and
hence, the performance analysis procedure for the RGCUSUM cannot be carried out for the GCUSUM.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
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Fig. 1: IEEE 14-bus power system. The red circles on the branches denote power-flow measurements,
and the green squares represent the power injection measurements.
In this section, we consider applying the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm to a dynamic smart grid
system, and we numerically evaluate its performance.
Simulations are performed on an IEEE-14 bus power system which is illustrated in Fig. 1, and the
measurement matrix H in (1) is determined accordingly for the dynamic DC model of the power system
in Fig. 1. The initial state of the power system is defined in the MATPOWER “case14” [22]. MATPOWER
is a MATLAB simulation toolbox for solving optimal power flow problems, which can provide realistic
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power flow data for different test systems that are widely considered in research-oriented studies as well
as in practice. We assume that the resistive load at bus 3 decreases by 100 watts per time instant, while
the resistive loads at bus 5 and bus 11 both increase by 100 watts per time instant. As such, the state
variables of the smart grid change accordingly over time. It is worth mentioning that due to the nonlinear
relationship between the state parameter vector θ(t) and the resistive loads at the buses, θ(t) cannot be
explicitly expressed as a function of the resistive loads at the buses. To this end, for each t, we resort
to some numerical method to obtain the time-varying state parameter vector θ(t) for the simulations. To
be specific, the MATPOWER “case14” DC power-flow algorithm is employed to generate θ(t) for each
t by taking the dynamic resistive loads into account.
A. Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 2 where the variance of
noise σ2 = 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, and 0.0005, respectively. In the simulation, ρL and ρU are set to be 0.025
and 100, respectively. The number of Monte Carlo runs is 300. Although the proposed RGCUSUM can
be applied to the cases where the FDIA a(t) is time-varying, for simplicity, a(t) is set to be a constant
vector in the simulations, which is
a(t) = [−2.629,−2.704, 2.781, 2.923, 0.516,−0.936, 1.969,−3.938,−0.033, 0,−0.483,−0.033,
− 1.934, 1.934,−1.934, 4.259, 2.842, 0.110, 1.314,−0.520, 2.195,−0.046, 1.778]T , ∀t ≥ 1. (76)
As shown in Fig. 2, for a given average detection delay, the average false alarm period of the RGCUSUM
increases as σ2 decreases. These numerical results agree with our theory presented in Section IV. To be
specific, it is seen from (18) and (28) that in the region where σ2 is small, the expectation of ζ(t)m is
mainly determined by the injected data a(t) in the presence of attacks, especially when pTma
(t) is large.
In light of this, we know from (24) that for a given threshold h, the change of σ2 cannot significantly
affect the average detection delay of the RGCUSUM in the presence of attacks in the region where σ2 is
small. On the other hand, as demonstrated by (18) and (27), the decrease of σ2 in the absence of attacks
brings about a relatively large decrease in the expectation of ζ(t)m , and therefore, it is seen from (24) that
in the absence of attacks, the average false alarm period of the RGCUSUM increases as σ2 decreases.
To this end, it is not surprising that for a given average detection delay, the average false alarm period
of the RGCUSUM algorithm increases as the variance of noise σ2 decreases in Fig. 2.
B. Performance Comparison
In this subsection, we compare the performance of the proposed RGCUSUM to that of existing
approaches for the same simulation setup described at the beginning of this section. As explained in
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Fig. 2: Performance of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm.
Section I-B, most of existing approaches cannot be applied to the simulation setup considered in this
paper. For example, the Kalman filter based algorithm proposed in [15] requires that the evolution of
the state parameter vector θ(t) with t follows a fixed linear model, and the linear matrix must be known
to the control center. However, for the simulation setup considered in this section, the evolution of the
state parameter vector θ(t) with t does not follow a linear model, and moreover, it seems impossible to
explicitly characterize this evolution. Thus, the decision statistic proposed in [15] cannot be evaluated
here. Likewise, the decision statistic proposed in [5] also cannot be evaluated for the simulation setup
considered in this section, since the covariance matrix of the residual is singular.
In the following, we compare the performance of the RGCUSUM with that of a representative approach,
called adaptive CUSUM algorithm proposed in [4]. The numerical comparison is illustrated in Fig. 3. In
the simulation, the variance of noise σ2 = 0.005, and ρL and ρU are set to be 0.025 and 100, respectively.
The number of Monte Carlo runs is 300. In the comparison, we consider two scenarios. In one scenario,
a(t) is set to be a constant vector as defined in (76). In the other scenario, a(t) is time-varying, which
are defined as, ∀r = 0, 1, 2, ...,
a(3r+1) =[0, 6.881,−1.776,−3.067, 0.747, 0.949, 0.545,−1.090,−0.249, 0,−0.498,−0.249,−0.351,
0.351,−0.351,−0.395, 0, 0.395, 0, 0.264, 0.132, 0.132, 0]T × [1 + (3r + 1)× 10−6], (77)
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Fig. 3: Performance comparison between the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm and the adaptive
CUSUM algorithm.
a(3r+2) = [− 3.528,−0.375,−0.246,−0.504, 1.008, 0.125, 0, 0.250, 0.125, 0.176,−0.176, 0.176,
0.199, 0,−0.199, 0,−0.132,−0.066,−0.066, 0]T × [1 + (3r + 2)× 10−6], (78)
a(3r+3) = [3.983, 5.254, 0,−4.445, 0.346, 0.578, 0.116,−0.231,−0.116, 0,−0.231,−0.116,−0.163,
0.163,−0.163,−0.184, 0, 0.184, 0, 0.122, 0.061, 0.061, 0]T × [1 + (3r + 3)× 10−6]. (79)
It is worth mentioning that a(3r+1), a(3r+2) and a(3r+3) all lie in the complementary space R⊥(H)
of the column space of H, and hence, we can see from (77), (78) and (79) that for r = 0, 1, 2, ...,
[A(3r+1)]C = {1, 10, 17, 19, 23}, [A(3r+2)]C = {2, 10, 17, 19, 23} and [A(3r+3)]C = {3, 10, 17, 19, 23},
where [A(t)]C denotes the complement of A(t) for any set A(t) of nonzero elements of µ(t).
It is seen from Fig. 3 that for a given average false alarm period, the average detection delay of the
proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is shorter than that of the adaptive CUSUM algorithm in both scenarios,
which implies that the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm can detect the FDIAs more efficiently than the
adaptive CUSUM algorithm. This is expected since the adaptive CUSUM algorithm builds on a different
model. To be specific, the adaptive CUSUM algorithm assumes that θ(t) is a Gaussian vector with some
known mean and covariance. However, in the simulation, θ(t) is an unknown deterministic vector for each
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t. The efficiency loss of the adaptive CUSUM algorithm may be brought about by the model mismatch.
Moreover, the adaptive CUSUM algorithm requires that the FDIAs are positive and small, and hence is
prone to efficiency loss for large and negative FDIA, which is the case in the simulation. In addition, as
illustrated in Fig. 3, the performance of the RGCUSUM algorithm in the scenario where a(t) is constant
is better than that in the scenario where a(t) is time-varying. One possible reason is that for a(t) in (76),
the corresponding [A(t)]C = {10} for all t. In light of this, in the scenario where a(t) is defined in (76),
the number of attacked meters is more than that in the scenario where a(t) is defined in (77), (78) and
(79). Hence, it should be easier for the RGCUSUM algorithm to detect the FDIAs in the case where a(t)
is defined in (76).
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Fig. 4: Average ratio of overshoot to threshold in the presence of attacks.
C. Numerical Verification of Negligible Expected Overshoot
In the proof of Theorem 2, the expectation of the overshoot is ignored as shown in (74), which
essentially requires that in the presence of attacks, the expectation of the overshoot is negligible when
compared to the threshold h. Here, we numerically scrutinize the average overshoot as a percentage of
the threshold h in the presence of attacks. In the simulation as shown in Fig. 4, we consider the same
case as that considered in Fig. 2 where σ2 = 0.005 and the number of Monte Carlo runs is 600. Fig. 4
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depicts that as the threshold h increases, the average ratio of the overshoot to h decreases to 0 in the
presence of attacks. In addition, for the other cases considered in Fig. 2, we observe similar results that
the average ratio of the overshoot to h decreases to 0 as h grows. Therefore, Wald’s approximations
employed in Theorem 2 are valid when the threshold is sufficiently large.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered a general problem of sequentially detecting time-varying FDIAs in
dynamic linear regression models, which subsumes the problem of sequentially detecting the FDIAs in
dynamic smart grid systems when the DC power flow model is adopted. The GCUSUM algorithm and
the RGCUSUM have been proposed to solve this problem, and we have shown that the computational
complexity of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm scales linearly with the number of observations. Thus,
the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm is amenable to implementation in practice. Furthermore, we also
have provided performance analysis of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm. To be specific, considering
Lordon’s setup, for any given constraint on the expected false alarm period, a lower bound on the
threshold employed in the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm has been derived, which provides a guideline
for the design of the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm to achieve the prescribed performance requirement.
In addition, for any given threshold employed in the proposed RGCUSUM algorithm, we also have
provided an upper bound on the worst-case expected detection delay. Finally, the performance of the
proposed RGCUSUM algorithm has been numerically studied based on an IEEE standard power system
under FDIAs.
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